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THE BATTLE OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY:    
THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUDIO AND VIDEO 
WORKS VIA THE INTERNET,                      




Just a few years ago, the little known phenomenon of the Internet 
was in its infancy.  However, in the last decade of the twentieth 
century the Internet exploded into an awesome resource of 
information that is constantly redefining the capabilities of 
communication, and consequently, the way that business is 
conducted around the world.1  With sales over the Internet projected 
to reach the $717 billion mark in 2001, up from $377 billion in 2000, 
the Internet has opened up new markets and streamlined old 
markets.2  It allows for the transfer of mass amounts of information 
between users, perhaps even millions of users, with the mere click of 
a mouse.3 
However, the growth of the Internet has not been entirely without 
drawbacks, especially regarding privacy and the protection of 
 
* David Balaban graduated from Rutgers University in 1998 having completed Bachelors 
Degrees in Music and in Finance.  Forthwith, he earned his juris doctorate at Fordham 
School of Law in 2001.  While at Fordham, Mr. Balaban attended undergraduate classes at 
the Juilliard School of Music.  In 2000, he distinguished himself as a winner of the annual 
Entertainment Law Initiative legal writing contest sponsored by the National Academy of 
Recording Arts and Sciences (NARAS) and the American Bar Association (ABA). 
 1 See generally Center for Research in Electronic Commerce, Graduate School of 
Business, the University of Texas at Austin, and Cisco Systems, Measuring the Internet 
Economy, (Jan. 2001), at http://www.Internetindicators.com (last visited Mar. 2001). 
 2 See NUA Analysis: Internet Generated Revenue 1996-2000, at 
http://www.nua.com/surveys/analysis/graphs_charts/comparisons/total_revenue_generated_
2 (last visited Oct. 2001). 
 3 See How Many Online?, at 
http://www.nua.com/surveys/how_many_online/index.html (last visited Oct. 2001). 
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intellectual property.4  While the increased capacity for worldwide 
communication has provided many advances for our society, it also 
poses many problems in its regulation.5  The anonymity and general 
unaccountability of users on the Internet coupled with inadequate 
security measures protecting information transfers hold far-reaching 
implications concerning the accessibility of privileged, private, or 
copyrighted information.6  For example, how secure are credit card 
and social security numbers submitted on web pages to facilitate 
purchases via the Internet?  What processes are available to web 
purchasers to verify that orders placed over the Internet have gone 
through a legitimate service and not through fraudulent Internet 
services created by scam artists?  Moreover, do we really want our 
children to be able to view pornography with the ease that they can 
access the latest baseball scores? 
In the area of copyright law nowhere has the advent of the Internet 
stirred up more controversy than in the music industry, specifically, 
in the distribution of audio works over the Internet.7  Whereas the 
growth of the Internet has spawned many other industries, the new 
medium has the potential to devastate the music industry because it 
provides an easy means to perpetuate the unauthorized dissemination 
of copyrighted musical works.8  Taken to its theoretical limit, 
without copyright protection, a single copy of a sound recording 
could be uploaded onto the Internet to provide an unlimited number 
of perfect but unlicensed copies available for free distribution.9  Just 
 
 4 See Beth Givens, Internet Privacy: Privacy Expectations in a High Tech World, 16 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 347, 351 (May 2001); Fighting Fire with Fire: How SDMI 
Saves Intellectual Property, at http://pacificresearch.org/issues/tech/eclips9908.html (last 
visited Oct. 2001). 
 5 Some issues of concern on the Internet are gambling, the policy for granting domain 
names, spamming, security, encryption, First Amendment freedom of speech issues, 
privacy, and content rating and filtering.  See generally John F. Delaney & M. Lorraine 
Ford, Representing the New Media Company 2001 The Law of The Internet: A Summary of 
U.S. Internet Caselaw And Legal Developments, 631 PLI/Pat 31 (Jan. 2001). 
 6 Id. at 46-59. 
 7 See Heather D. Rafter, William Sloan Coats, John G. Given & Vickie L. Feeman, 
Streaming into the Future: Music and Video Online, 590 PLI/Pat 559, 563-64 (Feb. 2000). 
 8 Supra note 1, at 9-10. 
 9 See Rex S. Heike and Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace: Liability on 
the Electronic Frontier, COMPUTER LAW, July 1994, at 6.  The combination of digital audio 
technology and networks such as the Internet produces an environment where music can 
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one compact disc (hereinafter CD), once uploaded onto the 
Internet, can be reproduced at no cost to supply the entire world with 
unauthorized copies of an artists songs.10  Moreover, after a CD has 
been uploaded onto the Internet, potential purchasers with access to 
the Internet may have little reason to buy physical copies of the CD.  
After all, the music is available for free on the Internet.  Presently, 
the music industry has not been able to enforce a reliable means by 
which to collect royalties for works distributed over the Internet.11  
Hence, artists may find themselves uncompensated for distribution of 
their music over the new medium.12 
In fact, Internet services that perpetuate the unauthorized copying 
of music, such as Napster and Gnutella were created for the sole 
purpose of facilitating the transfer of music files over the Internet.13  
They give users an easy way of pirating, or downloading, sound 
recordings without properly compensating the musical artists who 
created the recordings.14  Since it has been estimated that, if left 
 
easily be distributed to an unlimited amount of computer users.  See also Heather D. Rafter, 
William Sloan Coats, John G. Given, and Vickie L. Feeman, 20th Annual Institute on 
Computer Law Streaming Into the Future: Music and Video Online, 590 PLI/Pat 559, at 569 
(Feb. 2000).  In accordance with the first sale doctrine a person is permitted to buy a song 
from the Internet, such as a song downloaded in MP3 format, and then sell or give that same 
copy of the song to a friend.  However, the first sale doctrine does not permit a person to sell 
or otherwise transfer possession of a song obtained unlawfully, such as a pirated version.  
Likewise, the first sale doctrine would not allow a person to sell or give away a reproduction 
of a MP3 file if that same person only paid for one copy and was keeping the original 
download on his or her own computer. 
 10 See Fighting Fire with Fire: How SDMI Saves Intellectual Property, at 
http://pacificresearch.org/issues/tech/eclips9908.html (last visited Oct. 2001). 
 11 See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Record Labels, Music Publishers at Impasse (Aug. 23, 
2001), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/svtop/music082401.htm (last visited 
Nov. 2001). 
 12 See Internet Music Debate Plays Out on Capitol Hill (July 11, 2000), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/11/napster.hearing/ (last visited Nov. 
2001). 
 13 See Damien A. Riehl, Electronic Commerce in the 21st Century: Article Peer-to-Peer 
Distribution System: Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or an 
Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1767 (2001).  Napster and Gnutella link users 
with other users for the purpose of facilitating the copying of music files.  For more 
information on Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet, see zeropaid.com, at 
http://www.zeropaid.com (last visited Nov. 2000). 
 14 See Robert C. Edwards, The Napster Litigation: Who Said Nothing in this World is 
Free? A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.: Problems Presented, Solutions Explored, and 
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unfettered by ensuing lawsuits, Napster would have had 75 million 
users by the end of 2000, the music industry has been ardently 
seeking an equitable balance between copyright owners of sound 
recordings and the dissemination of their works over the Internet.15  
Without such a balance, the advent of the Internet has the potential to 
usurp the record industry as we know it today, leaving musical 
artists uncompensated for their efforts and redefining the 
relationships among musicians, record labels, music publishers, and 
the performing rights societies.16 
Moreover, the result of litigation in the music industry will have 
far-reaching implications in other industries as well.  The publishing, 
television, and film industries all have a stake in the development of 
copyright law on the Internet.17  For example, although only in its 
infancy, the publishing industry has already begun the process of 
online e-book distribution.18  As of July 2000 Stephen King became 
one of the first authors to experiment in publishing his books solely 
on the Internet when he made a portion of his latest serial novel, The 
Plant, available on his website.19  King experimented with 
distributing his intellectual property for compensation over the 
Internet by asking his readers to send him payment after 
downloading any of the installments of the serial, which he planned 
to release gradually in eight separate parts.20  King asked for $1.00 
for each download of any of the first three installments in the story 
and $2.00 for each download of any of the last five installments.21  
Furthermore, he stated that he would continue to release serials of the 
 
Answers Posed, 89 KY. L.J. 835 (2000/2001). 
 15 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1170106 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 16 Id. at *903. 
 17 See Jack Valenti, Theres No Free Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2000, at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/20000621_valenti_oped.html (last visited Oct. 2001). 
 18 Id.  For evolving case law concerning publication of e-books on the Internet, see 
Random House v. Rosetta Books, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 19 Stephen Kings serial was available for download at http://www.stephenking.com 
(last visited Mar. 2001).  Stephen King charged $1.00 to download each of the first three 
installments in the serial and $2.00 per download for installments IV, V, and VI. 
 20 Id.  King originally speculated that The Plant would continue for eight installments 
and cost readers only $13.00.  See also Paul Simon, Stephen King Temporarily Prunes 
Plant E-Novel, THE BOSTON HERALD, November 30, 2000, at 24. 
 21 See Neil J. Rosini & Howard M. Singer, Music and the Internet, 545 PLI/Pat 865, 
871. 
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story on the Internet only so long as 75% of the persons who 
downloaded each serial of the story sent him payment.22  In the first 
week of its availability online, an estimated 76.4% of readers, 
representing 116,200 downloads, mailed King $1.00.23  However, 
after a fair showing on the first serial it is estimated that King 
received payment for just 70% of the downloads of his second 
serial,24 which further degraded to only a 46% payment rate by the 
fourth installment.25  With such a drop-off in the payment rate, 
whether or not King will complete the serial is a question that only 
he can answer. 
What this means for the publishing industry is unclear, but 
following from Stephen Kings example, soon entire books or even 
entire libraries representing multitudes of copyrighted works may be 
posted on the Internet.26  Similar advances in technology will 
modernize the television and film industries.  With the impending 
invention of broadband technology, it is very likely that in the near 
future users will be able to upload and download even full length 
movies over the Internet with relative ease.27 
Some have argued, however, that free downloads available over 
the Internet will come at the direct expense of visual and recording 
 
 22 What percentage of downloaders paid for Stephen Kings The Plant?, at 
http://bookspot.com/know/kingplant.htm (last visited Aug. 2000). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See M.J. Rose, Stephen Kings Plant Uprooted (Nov. 28, 2000), at  
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,40356,00.html (last visited Mar. 2001). 
 26 See Robert Hertzberg, A Good E-Read?; For now, Electronic Books Will Make their 
Mark in Education, INTERNET WORLD (Nov. 1, 2000); see also 
http://www.stephenking.com/download.html (last visited Nov. 2001); Stephen King Buries 
the Plant, at http://cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,253187-412,00.shtml (last visited Nov. 
2001).  It seems that, at least for the moment in light of the dwindling payments, Stephen 
King has decided not to continue with installments in the series.  Having already written the 
first six installments, King has decided to devote his energies toward other endeavors for the 
time being. 
 27 To a limited extent the technology already exists in the form of DivX, a new 
technology that allows PC users with high-speed DSL lines or cable modems to download 
feature films from the Internet in less than two hours.  However, DivX was pulled from the 
market because of its failure to implement adequate security measures to protect 
copyrighted content.  See Clyde H. Wilson, Jr. & M. Susan Wilson, Cyberspace Litigation: 
Chasing the Information Highway Bandits, 36-OCT JTLATRIAL 48, at 50 (Oct. 2000). 
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artists, reducing the incentive for these creative talents to produce 
treasured works.28  Due to the free dissemination of copyrighted 
works over the Internet, in the long run, our society will suffer from 
the loss of art, in all of its forms, reducing the profound positive 
influence that art has upon our culture.29  In short, the millennium of 
the Internet will eliminate the modern day Michelangelo because his 
services are no longer valued.  Thus, it is imperative for the 
prosperity of our art and culture that a balance is accorded between 
copyright owners and the distribution of their works via the Internet. 
This note will examine the existing landscape of copyright law 
concerning the distribution of audio and video works over the 
Internet and suggest that a compromise be struck between copyright 
owners and the distribution of their works over the Internet.  Part II 
elaborates upon the means available to freely disseminate 
copyrighted audio works over the Internet.  Part III contains a 
summary of the more prominent legislative acts that pertain to the 
distribution of audio and video works.30  Part IV analyzes recent case 
law, and Part V argues that a balance must be accorded between 
copyright owners and the distribution of their works. 
II. THE MEANS BEHIND THE DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION OF AUDIO 
WORKS 
Music can be transmitted over the Internet in two methods, either 
through audio streaming, which is somewhat analogous to radio 
 
 28 Supra note 17.  See also responses to Valentis article at the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF), at http://www.eff.org and http://www.eff.org/IP/Video (last visited Nov. 
2000). 
 29 See Note, Visual Artists Rights in a Digital Age, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1991 
(June 1994). 
 30 One legislative act that this note will not review more thoroughly is the No Electronic 
Theft (NET) Act.  See Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678.  Enacted in December of 
1997, the NET Act introduced a number of changes to titles 17 and 18 of the U.S. Code that 
essentially reversed the decision in United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 
1994).  Under the NET Act, computer-based infringement of copyrighted material is now 
subject to criminal prosecution.  This is so regardless of whether the defendant derives a 
direct financial benefit from the acts of misappropriation.  Thus, persons pirating audio 
and/or video works over the Internet may now be prosecuted as criminals under the NET 
Act. 
FINAL.BALABAN 1/10/02  5:10 PM 
2001] BATTLE OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 241 
 
broadcasting, or through MP3 files, which are downloaded and may 
be played repeatedly, similar to CDs or tapes.31  Traditionally, only 
performances of music made available to a public audience have 
been subject to copyright law.32  However, the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (hereinafter ASCAP) has, to 
date, successfully argued that every transmission of music on the 
Internet constitutes a public performance.33  ASCAP has argued that 
the public audience for a sound recording transmitted over the 
Internet does not need to be located in one place, or even one time.34  
Since music on the Internet can often be downloaded at the 
convenience of the listener, it need not be broadcast to several 
listeners at a given time in order to constitute a performance.35  It is 
enough that a substantial number of listeners will, over time, access 
the recording.36  Thus, copyright law applies to all forms of music 
transmitted over the Internet. 
 
 31 See Internet & Wireless Transmission: Music on the Web, at 
http://www.riaa.org/Audio_Media_2.cfm (last visited Oct. 2001).  Audio streaming, also 
known as webcasting, is the continuous playing of music in real time broadcasts over the 
Internet.  Listeners to webcasts, much like in television and radio, listen to webcasts as they 
are broadcast.  MP3 files, on the other hand, are downloaded by a user for repeated listening 
at his convenience, more like the playing use of CDs, tapes, and records.  Once an MP3 file 
is downloaded it can be listened to fully independent of the source of the downloaded file. 
 32 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) for a definition of public performance: To perform or 
display the copyrighted work publicly means: (a) to perform or display it at a place open to 
the public or where a substantial number of persons are gathered, (b) to transmit or 
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause 
(a) above or to the public, by means of any device or process. 
 33 See Comments of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers on the 
Preliminary Draft of the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, 
submitted and filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on September 7, 1994 
(Comments filed on behalf of Marilyn Bergman, President, ASCAP, on the Green Paper by 
the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights and the National Information 
Infrastructure); Hearing on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual 
Prop., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Frances W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast 
Music, Inc.) available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/462.htm (last visited Oct. 2001). 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. 
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A. Audio Streaming 
Audio streaming is the live flow of music in digital form over the 
Internet by an Internet Service Provider (hereinafter ISP).37  Audio 
streaming is somewhat analogous to radio broadcasting in that music 
is broadcast over the Internet for immediate listening.38  Much like 
radio, music transmitted in audio streams is presently inferior in 
quality to that of a CD.39  Nevertheless, the technology is likely to 
improve to the point where streaming audio can be broadcast and 
subsequently recorded while retaining the quality of a conventional 
CD.40 
B. MP3 Downloads of Individual Computer Files 
Individual computer files, on the other hand, are copies of music 
that are near to the quality of CDs.41 Individual files are compressed 
recordings of music that occupy only a small amount of memory on a 
computer.42  Some formats for these recordings are MP3, a2b, 
 
 37 See Business 2.0: Glossary, at http://www.business2.com/glossary/1,1652,S,FF.html 
(last visited Oct. 2001). 
 38 On Dec. 11, 2000 the Copyright Office came out with a new ruling concerning the 
broadcast of music over the Internet via audio streaming and webcasting.  See 37 C.F.R. § 
201 (2000). 
 39 Heather D. Rafter, William Sloan Coats, Vickie L. Feeman & John G. Given, 
Streaming into the Future: Music and Video Online, 611 PLI/Pat 395 at 400 (2000). 
 40 See Bob Godwin Jones, Emerging Technologies: Real-time Audio and Video 
Playback on the Web, Language Learning & Technology, July 1997, at 5, at 
http://polyglot.cal.msu.edu/111+/volinum1/emerging.htm (last visited Oct. 2001). 
 41 See MP3 & Real Audio How-to, at http://www.salon.com/audio/2000/10/02/help/ 
(last visited Oct. 2001). 
 42 MP3 files compress music by utilizing audio coding and psychoacoustic compression 
to remove redundant and irrelevant parts of a sound signal that the human ear, for the most 
part, does not hear.  However, compression algorithms are not perfect and may result in a 
degradation of the sound quality of the music, most notable to those with highly trained 
ears.  MP3 files accomplish compression by reducing the bit rate for music of 1411.2 kbps 
of stereo music by a factor of 10 to 14 down to 112-128 kbps.  For example, under normal 
conditions an uncompressed three-minute song will take up approximately 32 megabytes of 
space.  By reducing the bit rate, MP3 compression reduces the amount of space needed 
down to approximately 3 megabytes of space.  For further information, see How MP3 Files 
Work, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/mp3.htm (last visited Mar. 2001). 
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RealAudio, and LiquidAudio files.43  Of these formats, MP3, which 
was originally created for the purpose of compressing motion picture 
files, has become the most popular.44  MP3 files download much 
faster than the uncompressed .wav (wave) files that they replaced 
and cut download times from up to two hours to less than five or ten 
minutes per song.45  Nonetheless, MP3 files occupy only a fraction 
of the space of .wav files on a hard drive, thereby making them 
highly desirable in an age where hard drive memory is available at a 
relatively low cost.46 
C. File-sharing: Napster and Gnutella Facilitate the Widespread 
Downloading of MP3 Files. 
File-sharing software, available over the Internet, makes it easy to 
download and thereby distribute music on the Internet in mass levels 
at no cost to the user, often without providing for compensation to 
copyright owners for the widespread distribution of their musical 
works.47  File-sharing is available free of charge to the user via 
various websites, such that persons who have downloaded the 
necessary software can log-on to the Internet and share MP3 music 
files with other users who are simultaneously logged on to the 
system.48  Napster, a start-up company based in San Mateo, 
California, and the less user-friendly Gnutella, were among the first 
 
 43 See Neil J. Rosini & Howard M. Singer, Music and The Internet 1. Technologies 
Used In Delivering Music On The Net 2. Summary Of Online Rights, Sources, and Licenses 
Under Copyright For Music and Sound Recordings 3. Online and Summary Of The Digital 
Performance Right In Sound Recordings Act Of 1995 As Amended By The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act Of 1998 4. ASCAP Experimental License Agreement For Internet 
Sites On The World Wide WebRelease 2.0 5. BMI Web Site Music Performance 
Agreement 6. Music Download Questionnaire, 545 PLI/Pat 865, 870-71 (Jan. 1999). 
 44 See Whit Andrews, Downloadable Files Hit Mainstream, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 12, 
1999.  Incidentally, MP3 stands for Motion Picture Experts Group (MPEG) one layer 
three. 
 45 Supra note 42, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/mp3.htm (last visited Mar. 2001). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Supra note 13, at 1779.  Some other popular file swapping services are Freenet and 
Aimster.  See John Borland, File-Swapping Aimster to Tap Into ICQ, Napster, at 
http://www.news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-2776806.html (last visited Dec. 2000). 
 48 For a listing of file-sharing services, visit http://www.zeropaid.com (last visited Dec. 
2000).  See also supra note 47. 
FINAL.BALABAN 1/10/02  5:10 PM 
244 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:235 
 
to offer file-sharing services and have received much press recently 
in light of recent litigation against Napster.49 
File-sharing services such as Napster provide peer-to-peer (also 
known as P2P) file-sharing over the Internet.50  Peer-to-peer file-
sharing, made possible through particular software applications, 
allows account holders to conduct relatively sophisticated searches 
for music files containing songs from their favorite artists on the hard 
drives of millions of other anonymous users.51  Thus, Napsters peer-
to-peer filing system, which is run from a centralized location, 
Napsters website, connects users to one another and facilitates the 
searching and downloading of music files.52 
How do music files get onto the Internet in the first place?  
Converting music from a standard CD into MP3 format for 
distribution via Napster or Gnutella is a simple process.  The 
required software is available at no cost from many sources, 
including Napster.53  The software allows users to rip, or copy, a 
song from a CD and convert it into MP3 format.  Once the music is 
in MP3 format, it can easily be uploaded onto the Napster system 
and is available for others to copy at their discretion.  Furthermore, 
once a sound recording has been uploaded onto the Internet, it can be 
downloaded by millions of users with little to no sound 
degradation.54   Unlike  tapes  or  photocopies,  even  a  fifth  or  one- 
 
 49 See How Napster Works, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/napster4.htm (last visited 
Mar. 2001).  See also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1170106, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000). 
 50 See How Napster Works, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/napster4.htm (last visited 
Mar. 2001). 
 51 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing 
Def.s Mot. for Summ. J.) [hereinafter Napster I]. 
 52 John Borland, File-Swapping Aimster to Tap into ICQ, Napster, CNET News.com, 
September 14, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-2776806.html (last visited 
Oct. 2001).  Gnutella is very similar to Napster in its ability to allow users to share files, but 
differs primarily in that file-sharing software for Gnutella shifts from computer to computer 
and is not run primarily from any one website or location. 
 53 See supra note 8.  Visit http://www.zeropaid.com for other sources that provide the 
necessary software for uploading music (last visited Sept. 2001). 
 54 See How MP3 Files Work, at http://www.howstuffworks.com (last visited Mar. 
2001). 
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thousandth generation copy of an MP3 sound recording will be 
virtually identical to the original.55 
III. LEGISLATION: THE BATTLE BEGINS 
The recording industry has always been concerned with the 
consumers ability to copy and distribute music without 
compensation to recording artists.56  Before the creation of the 
Internet, the technology that first enabled the consumer to make his 
own copies of music came with the commercial exploitation of 
magnetic tapes.57  Although the first magnetic tape recorder was 
developed in 1898, it wasnt until the middle of the twentieth century 
that tape recorders became a commercially viable product.58  For the 
 
 55 Tamber Christian, Internet Caching: Something to Think About, 67 UMKC L. REV. 
477 (1999) (stating that unlike copying from cassette, materials copied from the Internet 
retain the same high quality as the original and do not decrease in quality with each 
additional copy made). 
 56 In 1908 musicians and composers began lobbying Congress for protection from the 
uncompensated distribution of their works following on the heels of the first U.S. court 
decision concerning the copying of music.  See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 
290 U.S. 1 (1908), holding that perforated rolls of paper used in automatic player pianos to 
play musical compositions are not copies of musical compositions and therefore do not 
infringe upon the rights of copyright owners.  As a result of their lobbying, mechanical 
compulsory licenses were introduced into U.S. copyright law for the first time in the 1909 
Copyright Act.  Soon after, in 1914, ASCAP was founded by Irving Berlin, among other 
musicians, as a performing rights society to protect musicians rights. 
 57 For some very informative websites detailing the history of sound recording, 
including the introduction into the marketplace of magnetic tapes and digital recording 
equipment, see Steve Schoenherr, Recording Technology History, at 
http://history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/notes.html (last visited Mar. 2001); Jones 
Telecommunications & Multimedia Encyclopedia Audio Recording: History and 
Development, at http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/audiohd.html (last visited 
Mar. 2001); and Sound Recording History, at 
http://www.inventors.about.com/science/inventors/library/inventors/blsoundrecording.htm?t
erms=phonograph (last visited Mar. 2001). 
 58 See Sound Recording History,  at 
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blsoundrecording.htm (last visited Nov. 2001).  
The first magnetic recording device was invented by Valdemar Poulsen in 1898.  Poulsens 
device recorded sound onto magnetized steel piano wire.  Prior to the invention of Poulsens 
magnetic recording device, Thomas Edison created the first recording medium, the cylinder 
phonograph, in 1877.  The first magnetic tape recording device was created during World 
War II by Joseph Begun.  See 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/pulse/9807.htm (last visited Nov. 2001). 
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first time, during the 1960s, consumers could buy tape recorders and 
make recordings of music at their own discretion.59  Still, the 
recording technology remained imperfect.60  Tape recordings did not 
fully and accurately capture the essence of musical works.61  Since 
successive copies of tapes tended to degrade in sound quality even 
further, the consumers ability to distribute music to others was very 
limited, ensuring the need for consumers to purchase originals of the 
sound recordings.62 
However, in the late 1980s manufacturers of recording devices 
developed the digital audio tape (hereinafter DAT), which was the 
first technology to permit consumers to make perfect copies of sound 
recordings.63  At the time of its development, much like the invention 
of MP3 files, the invention of the DAT concerned the music 
industry.64  DAT enabled a consumer to make perfect copies of 
music and then distribute the copies to others.65  In turn, these people 
could then make perfect copies of their copies to distribute to yet 
more people, and so on down the line without ever compensating the 
recording artists for what may inevitably be mass distribution of the 
musical work.66 
 
 59 See Steve Schoenherr, Recording Technology History, at 
http://history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/notes.html (last visited Nov. 2001).  Philips 
introduced its first compact audio cassette in 1963, which sold the next year in the U.S. 
along with the Norelco Carry-Corder dictation machine.  At about the same time, the eight 
track recording medium also made its debut. 
 60 See William Sloan Coats, et al., PLIs Sixth Annual Institute for Intellectual Property 
Law: Streaming Into the Future: Music and Video Online, 616 PLI/Pat 149, 164 (2000). 
 61 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 12 (1995) (stating that consumers have embraced 
digital recordings because of their superior sound quality). 
 62 See Christopher Yang & William W. Fisher III, Peer-to-Peer Copying (Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School 2001), at 
http://con.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/P2P/ (stating that records and cassettes are subject to wear 
and tear, and multiple generation copies often suffer from poor quality, thereby reducing the 
threat of large scale high quality piracy). 
 63 See supra note 60. 
 64 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 2, at 2 (1992). 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. 
FINAL.BALABAN 1/10/02  5:10 PM 
2001] BATTLE OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 247 
 
A. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 
In response to the invention of DAT technology, the record labels 
joined together in worldwide negotiations in 1987.67  Two years 
later, after extensive lobbying to gain support from other factions in 
the music industry, such as music publishers, songwriters, and the 
performing rights societies, the music industry banded together to 
lobby Congress for additional copyright protection.68  Congress, 
hearing the plea of the music industry, passed the Audio Home 
Recording Act (hereinafter AHRA) into legislation in October of 
1992.69 
The AHRA strikes a balance between the owners of copyrights in 
sound recordings and the manufacturers of recording equipment.70  
On the one hand, it provides manufacturers and distributors of digital 
and analog audio recording devices protection from copyright 
infringement actions and thereby promotes the sale of digital and 
analog recording devices.71  However, in exchange for the limitations 
that this places upon the music industry, the AHRA requires 
manufacturers and distributors of digital audio recording devices and 
media (hereinafter DART) that are imported to or distributed in the 
U.S. to contribute to a royalty fund deposited with the Register of 
Copyrights.72  The royalties from the DART fund provide 
compensation to recording artists, copyright owners, and music 
publishers that hold copyrights in sound recordings.73 
 
 67 See id.; see also supra note 60. 
 68 See supra note 60, at 165. 
 69 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 1623, 106 Stat. 4237 
(1992). 
 70 See supra note 63, at 165.  See H.R. REP. No. 104-274 (1995) (describing background 
and need for legislation). 
 71 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994). 
 72 See Recent Development In the Legislature/In the Agencies Copyright: Copyright 
Office Modifies CARP Distribution Order, 9 No. 4 JPROPR 34 (1997); see also 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1003-1004 (1994). 
 73 See 17 U.S.C. § 1006 (1994). 
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1. Distribution of the DART Fund 
Prior to allocating money to individual claimants, the DART fund 
is divided into Sound Recording Funds, Musical Works Funds and 
their respective sub-funds.74  Payments from the Sound Recording 
Funds and the Musical Works Funds are subsequently distributed to 
interested claimants pursuant to a negotiated settlement or a 
distribution order by the Library of Congress following a distribution 
proceeding by a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (hereinafter 
CARP).75  In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the AHRA 
establishes the percentages for each fund and sub-fund, and directs 
the CARPs to determine the appropriate distribution amounts to 
which each claimant is entitled.76 
The distribution of DART funds occurs in two phases.  In Phase I 
of the distribution process, royalties from the funds are apportioned 
among eight classes of claimants.77  In Phase II, awards are then 
made to individual copyright owners within each of the classes.78  If, 
at either phase, a controversy arises regarding the appropriate 
disposition of all or a portion of the royalties, the Librarian convenes 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.  For more information on the royalty rates established by the AHRA, see DONALD 
PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS (1997). 
 77 See Distribution of 1990, 1991, and 1992 Cable Royalties, 61 Fed. Reg. 55, 655 (Oct. 
28, 1996).  The eight classes have traditionally been the: (1) Program Suppliers, which are 
the copyright owners of syndicated television series, movies, and television specials; (2) 
Joint Sports Claimants, which are the copyright owners of live telecasts of professional and 
college team sports; (3) National Association of Broadcasters (also known as Commercial 
Television), which are the copyright owners of programstypically news and local interest 
programsproduced by broadcast stations; (4) Public Broadcasting Service (also known as 
Noncommercial Television), which are the copyright owners of all programming 
broadcast by the Public Broadcasting Service that do not fall within another category; (5) 
Devotional Claimants, which are copyright owners of syndicated programs with a religious 
theme that do not fall within another category; (6) Canadian Claimants, which are the 
copyright owners of programs broadcast on Canadian stations that do not fall within another 
category; (7) Music Claimants, which are the copyright owners of musical works broadcast 
on all programming, as represented by the performing rights societies ASCAP, BMI and 
SESAC; and (8) National Public Radio, representing the copyright owners of all programs 
broadcast on National Public Radio stations that do not fall within the Music Claimants 
category. 
 78 See id. 
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a CARP to propose a settlement.79  For example, in a Phase II 
proceeding within the Music Claimants class, the copyright owners 
represented by ASCAP may be in controversy with the copyright 
owners represented by BMI as to the division of royalties allotted to 
the Music Claimants category after the conclusion of the Phase I 
proceeding.80  If such a controversy exists, the Librarian would 
conduct a Phase II proceeding under the same provisions of the 
Copyright Act applicable to the Phase I proceeding.81 
 
2. Serial Copyright Management System 
 
The AHRA also requires that each DAT device incorporate a copy 
control mechanism, either the Serial Copy Management System 
(hereinafter SCMS) or any other system certified by the Secretary 
of Commerce as prohibiting unauthorized serial copying.82  This 
provision protects copyright owners from an economic loss by 
preventing subsequent copies of a musical work that would 
otherwise result in an unlimited amount of permissible copies of their 
works.  The AHRA allows unlimited first generation copies of music 
to be made from the original recording, but prevents recording a 
copy from a copy.83 
3. An Exemption for Computer Hard Drives 
Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Recording Indus. Assn of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia has 
interpreted the AHRA as wholly exempting computer hard drives 
and MP3 files copied onto computer hard drives from its 
provisions.84  Prior to the Ninth Circuits decision, the AHRA 
 
 79 See id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 17 U.S.C. § 801-803 (1994). 
 82 Id. at § 1002 (1994). 
 83 138 CONG. REC. H9029 at 9043 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992). 
 84 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Diamond II].  See discussion infra 
Part IV(A).  Some have argued that the Ninth Circuits determination does not conform with 
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already exempted professional devices such as dictation machines, 
answering machines, and other recording devices whose primary 
purpose is the fixation of non-musical sounds.85  In its decision, the 
Ninth Circuit extended this exemption to include computer hard 
drives, stating that the primary purpose of a computer is not to make 
digital recordings of music and therefore, the AHRA does not govern 
the copying of music files to and from computer hard drives.86  The 
Ninth Circuit, citing 17 U.S.C. § 1008, asserted that such a result was 
in keeping with the underlying purpose of the AHRA to allow 
consumers to make copies of audio recordings for their private, 
noncommercial use.87  Furthermore, citing Sony Corp. v. Universal 
Studios, Inc., where time-shifting by users of home video recorders 
was held to be fair use, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the MP3 
player in question, the Rio player, merely performs the equally 
innocuous function of space-shifting music from a computers hard 
drive into a portable player.88 
B. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 
Although the AHRA may have created an effective balance 
between manufacturers of recording equipment and the music 
industry, as noted above, it did not sufficiently address music 
distributed through computers via the Internet.89  Moreover, the 
 
the underlying purpose of the AHRA and that the drafters of the AHRA did not intend to 
exclude music fixed on computer hard drives from the definition of digital musical 
recording under the AHRA.  See Brendan M. Schulman, The Song Heard Round the 
World: The Copyright Implications of MP3s and the Future of Digital Music, 12 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 589, 608-10 (1999); Alex Alleman, Manifestation of an AHRA Malfunction: The 
Uncertain Status of MP3 Under Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond 
Multimedia Systems, Inc., 79 TEX. L. REV. 189 (2000). 
 85 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3)(B). 
 86 See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1077. 
 87 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (exempting, among other instances, the noncommercial copying of 
music from the bounds of the AHRA).  See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1079. 
 88 See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1079.  See also infra Part IV(A) and Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984) (holding to be fair use the time-
shifting of copyrighted material by VCRs, allowing VCR owners to tape programs for 
later viewing). 
 89 Current copyright law is inadequate to address all of the issues raised by these new 
technologies dealing with the digital transmission of sound recordings and musical works 
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AHRA, and prior copyright law concerning recording artists, 
primarily addressed the musicians need to protect against the 
uncompensated physical distribution of albums, in the form of 
records, tapes, and CDs, and not the digital distribution of music 
over the Internet.90  Copyright law prior to the creation of the 
Internet, including the Sound Recording Act Amendment of 1971 
(granting musicians copyright protection in sound recordings),91 the 
1976 Copyright Act,92 and the AHRA, could not have anticipated the 
growth of the Internet and the distribution of sound recordings 
thereof. 
Nevertheless, researchers estimate that Internet sales of music 
represented 2.4% of all sales in the music industry for the year 2000, 
which may grow to 25% of revenues (totaling $1.25 billion) by the 
year 2005.93  Important to the music industry, the advent of the 
Internet began a shift in sales away from the physical sale of albums 
toward the digital distribution of music, leaving artists without 
legislation supporting their need for compensation from music 
distributed over the new medium.94  In response to the shift away 
from physical album sales, Congress enacted the Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (hereinafter 
DPRA).95 
 
and, thus, to protect the livelihoods of the recording artists, songwriters, record companies, 
music publishers and others who depend upon revenues derived from traditional record 
sales.  In particular, recording artists and record companies cannot be effectively protected 
unless copyright law recognizes at least a limited performance right in sound recordings.  
See supra note 7, at 579-82. 
 90 See id. at 580-81. 
 91 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
 92 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 93 Laura Carr, Net Music Sales Are Still Ringing, The Standard, August 21, 2000, at 
http://www.thestandard.com/research/metrics/display/0,2799,17774,00.html (last visited 
Nov. 2000). 
 94 S. REP. No. 104-128 (1995).  See also June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in 
Sound Recordings Act and Its Failure to Address the Issue of Digital Musics New Form of 
Distribution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (1997). 
 95 Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). 
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1. Recording Artists Need Digital Performance Rights. 
Traditionally, sound recordings have included two distinct 
copyrights: a copyright in the underlying musical composition to be 
performed on a recording and a copyright in the physical sound 
recording itself.96  Generally, the songwriter, composer, or his 
designated music publisher owns the copyright in the underlying 
musical composition, which includes a performance right, and the 
record label (which pays royalties to the recording artist) owns the 
copyright in the sound recording, which has not traditionally 
included a performance right.97  Since radio stations have not 
traditionally had to pay for a performance right to broadcast music, 
when a song is played on the radio the owner of the copyright in the 
musical composition receives compensation for a performance of his 
music, but the record label, the artists, and their producers do not 
receive compensation.98  For example, Madonna recorded the song 
American Pie composed by Don McLean.  However, unless the 
parties have specifically negotiated a supervening agreement, only 
Don McLean receives royalties for the radio stations performance of 
the music because he, or his designated music publisher, owns the 
underlying copyright in the music.  Madonna receives royalties only 
from the sale of physical copies of the recording in the form of CDs, 
tapes, and records and does not receive compensation directly from 
the broadcast. 
Perhaps one reason why performance rights were not granted prior 
to the DPRA is the status quo in radio broadcasting.  Radio stations 
have argued since well before the advent of the Internet that they 
provide free advertisement for recording artists through 
performances of an artists works during radio broadcasts.99  Their 
 
 96 See Bob Kohn, A Primer On The Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery, 20 
No. 4 ENT. L. REP.  4 (1998). 
 97 See id.; see also supra note 32 (defining performance of a musical work). 
 98 See Bob Kohn, A Primer On The Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery, 20 
No. 4 ENT. L. REP.  4 (1998). 
 99 See Whitmark v. Bamberger, 291 F. 776 (D.C.N.J. 1923); Stuart Talley, Performance 
Rights in Sound Recordings: Is There Justification In The Age Of Digital Broadcasting?,  28 
BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSN J. 79, 85 (1994); see also Jeffrey A. Abrahamson, Tuning Up 
For A New Musical Age: Sound Recording Copyright Protection in a Digital Environment, 
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argument is that free advertisement popularizes a recording artists 
music and induces further sales of his albums, for which the artist 
will receive compensation.100  Therefore, because recording artists 
will receive compensation from increased album sales, the radio 
stations argue that they should not have to further compensate 
recording artists by paying for a performance right to broadcast 
music.101  Historically the reasoning of the radio broadcasters has 
been a matter of controversy and undergone severe criticism, 
including a report by the Register of Copyrights suggesting that 
Congress should grant a performance right to the copyright owners 
of sound recordings.102  Congress, however, chose not to address 
the granting of performing rights until the passage of the DPRA into 
legislation.103  Moreover, under the traditional regime, radio stations 
have not had to pay for a performance right for analog broadcasts of 
music and recording artists have had to rely upon compensation only 
from the physical sale of CDs, tapes, and records.104 
However, with the rapid expansion of the Internet, recording artists 
have an increasing need for performance rights because the digital 
distribution of music, in the form of MP3 files, has disrupted the 
recording artists ability to receive royalties from physical album 
sales.105  The introduction of the Internet has begun the shift away 
 
25 AIPLA Q.J. 181, 183 (1997). 
 100 See Talley, supra note 99. 
 101 See id.  It should be noted that although radio stations have been successful in 
lobbying against compensating artists for analog broadcasts of music, radio stations have 
not been as successful in lobbying against compensating artists for digital webcasts of 
music.  In December of 2000, the Copyright Office, with perhaps questionable authority, 
took the position that radio stations are not exempt from copyright owners digital 
performance rights in sound recordings for music broadcast over the Internet.  See Public 
Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, at 
http://www.loc.gov/copyright/fedreg/2000/65fr77292.pdf (last visited Nov.  2001).  
Regulations set forth by the Copyright Office further defining broadcast transmissions for 
the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 114 would require radio stations to pay a statutory fee for a 
compulsory license to broadcast music over the Internet or negotiate with the artists for a 
license.  Id.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 115.  At least one court has upheld the determination of 
the Copyright Office and granted summary judgment against the radio stations.  See 
Bonneville Intl Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 102 Talley, supra note 99, at 85. 
 103 Id. 
 104 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 105 See David Balaban, Music in the Digital Millennium: The Effects of the Digital 
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from the physical distribution of music toward the digital distribution 
of musical works.106  Whereas sales of music are reportedly up 20% 
overall in the last two years, a study by Michael Fine, CEO of 
SoundScan, indicates that sales near college areas where Napster has 
been widespread are down 4%.107  This could have exponential 
effects upon the music industry as the younger generations, more apt 
to acquire music over the Internet, begin to displace the older 
generations as the major purchasers of music. 
Moreover, although the transmission of music over the Internet 
disrupted the established arrangement for compensating musicians, 
prior to the enactment of the DPRA recording artists did not have a 
performance right in music transmitted over the Internet to reflect the 
shift in the distribution of music from a physical medium to a digital 
medium.  Not only could a recording artists music be distributed 
easily via the Internet to many potential consumers, displacing the 
artists album sales, but existing legislation did not support 
compensating the artist for Internet transmissions of his works. 
2. Provisions of the DPRA 
Acknowledging that the transmission of music over the Internet 
could cause a shift away from the sale of physical copies of music 
toward the digital distribution of music, Congress granted musicians 
a digital performance right in sound recordings.108  In November 
1995, President Clinton signed into law the DPRA, which amended 
§§ 106 and 114 of the Copyright Act and, for the first time, 
 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 311 (1998). 
 106 See John Borland & Rachel Konrad, Study Finds Napster Use May Cut Into Record 
Sales, CNET News.com, May 25, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-
1945948.html (last visited Aug.  2001).  For background information on SoundScan, see 
generally supra note 60, at 161.  SoundScan measures how many records are sold at retail.  
This information is used for Billboards charts. 
 107 Id.  One reason for the displacement of physical album sales may be that 
transmissions of MP3 files always result in a perfect additional copy of the music being 
created and distributed to a new listener. Compare this to radio where a listener merely has 
the option to make a tape recording of a radio broadcast that will invariably suffer in sound 
quality due to the broadcast mechanism.  See supra note 28. 
 108 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 
109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114 (1995)). 
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attempted to give musicians limited protection in sound recordings 
performed over the Internet.109  The DPRA was the first act to 
specifically address the implications of digital transmissions of 
music.110  It increased protection for owners of sound recording 
copyrights in order to compensate for the shift in the distribution of 
music from physical to digital recordings.111 
Specifically, the DPRA extended the rights of recording artists to 
include digital phonorecord deliveries and granted, under § 106(6), 
a new exclusive right to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission.112  Digital phonorecord 
deliveries, under the DPRA, include all transmissions, such as 
transmissions of MP3 files that result in a specifically identifiable 
reproduction of music.113  Furthermore, the DPRA extends 
performing rights to include some transmissions that may not 
typically result in a digital phonorecord delivery.114 
Of those transmissions that do not result in a digital phonorecord 
delivery, the DPRA distinguishes between interactive and non-
interactive services to determine which transmissions are required to 
be licensed.115  An interactive service is one that enables a member 
of the public to receive, on request, a transmission of a particular 
sound recording chosen by or on behalf of the recipient.116  Services 
such as audio-on-demand, pay-per-listen, and celestial jukebox 
transmissions are all examples of interactive services.117  Interactive 
services must be licensed under the DPRA because Congress felt that 
 
 109 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 110 June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act and Its Failure 
to Address the Issue of Digital Musics New Form of Distribution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1361, 
1365 (1997).  See Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). 
 111 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995) (describing background and need for legislation). 
 112 See Nancy A. Bloom, Protecting Copyright Owners of Digital MusicNo More Free 
Access to Cyber Tunes, 45 JOURNAL OF THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. 179,  200 
(1997).  See also 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (1995). 
 113 See Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).  See also 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). 
 114 See supra note 72. 
 115 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 116 See  H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995). 
 117 David Nimmer, Ignoring The Public, Part I: On the Absurd Complexity of the Digital 
Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189, 246 (2000). 
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a consumer who is given the option to listen to a song at his 
convenience might have little reason to purchase that song in a 
store.118  Therefore, interactive services were thought to be likely to 
displace physical album sales. 
Concerning non-interactive services, those with transmissions that 
do not result in a digital phonorecord delivery yet are not part of an 
interactive service, there are two types: subscription transmissions 
and non-subscription transmissions (to be discussed below).119  A 
subscription transmission is one that is controlled and limited to 
particular recipients, and for which the recipients must pay 
consideration.120  Because Congress felt that some subscription 
services were more likely to displace physical album sales than 
others, subscription transmissions are further subdivided into two 
categories: (i) voluntary subscription transmissions and (ii) 
compulsory subscription transmissions.121 
Both types of subscription transmissions require licenses from the 
owner of the copyrights in the sound recordings, typically record 
companies.122  However, the payment scheme is different for each of 
the two types of subscription licenses.123  For voluntary subscription 
transmissions, the record companies are free to proscribe all 
applicable fees or to decline to license the music at all.124  For 
compulsory subscription transmissions that satisfy the requirements 
of § 114, the record companies are subject to compulsory licensing at 
a statutory fee that serves as a maximum amount charged.125 
Meanwhile, non-subscription broadcasts do not require licenses 
under the DPRA.126  Non-subscription transmissions are defined to 
include any transmission that is not a subscription transmission.127  
 
 118 See  H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995). 
 119 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d). 
 120 See  H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995).  See also S. REP. NO. 104-128 (1995). 
 121 See  H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See  H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995). 
 127 Id. 
FINAL.BALABAN 1/10/02  5:10 PM 
2001] BATTLE OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 257 
 
Whereas Congress felt that the risk of a music service that consumers 
pay for on a subscription basis poses a moderate to high risk of 
replacing the sales of records, Congress also felt that transmissions 
that are on a non-subscription basis, like traditional style radio 
broadcasts over the internet, posed only a low risk of replacing 
record sales.128  While the Copyright Office has since taken a 
somewhat contrary position, as originally enacted non-subscription 
broadcast transmissions by radio and television stations were 
exempted from licensing under the DPRA unless they were part of 
an interactive service.129 
The classification of a transmission as an interactive, subscription, 
or non-subscription service determines whether the license should 
fall under a statutory compulsory rate, or must be individually 
negotiated and administered.130  For example, for a non-interactive 
subscription service fulfilling the requirements of the DPRA, where 
the end user downloading the music is required to pay for 
transmission of a sound recording, the provider of the download to 
the user must pay a licensing fee.131  However, non-interactive 
services, such as desktop broadcast sites that automatically play a 
sound recording, may be exempt from digital public performance 
fees.132  Moreover, interactive services, such as a website that 
delivers sound recordings on demand, must negotiate a non-
exclusive license fee for the transmission of music.133 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id.  See supra note 101.  Regulations set forth by the Copyright Office in December 
2000 further define broadcast transmissions for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 114 to require 
radio stations to pay a statutory fee for a compulsory license to broadcast music over the 
internet or negotiate with the artists for a license.  Id.; See 17 U.S.C. § 115.  At least one 
court has upheld the determination of the Copyright Office and granted summary judgment 
against the radio stations.  See Bonneville Intl Corp  v. Peters, 153 F.Supp.2d. 763 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001). 
 130 See  H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995). 
 131 Id. 
 132 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Nancy A. Bloom, Protecting 
Copyright Owners of Digital MusicNo More Free Access to Cyber Tunes, 45 JOURNAL OF 
THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. 179 (1997). 
 133 See Bloom, supra note 112, at 200. 
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3. The DPRA: A Watered Down Version of the Performance 
Right 
Notably, because the DPRA represents a compromise between the 
recording industry and radio broadcasters who were largely 
concerned with the audio streaming of music, some have argued that 
it was so watered down by the time it was passed that its exceptions 
override its rules.134  In particular, the act has been criticized for the 
limits imposed upon the grant of performance rights.135  Most 
notably, as originally enacted the DPRA does not cover most 
instances of radio and television broadcasts of music.136  Moreover, 
because of lobbying by broadcasters, the DPRA also excludes certain 
other services from paying royalties to copyright owners.137  
Therefore, it has been argued that the DPRA does not always grant 
owners of copyrights in sound recordings protection in situations 
where the digital transmission of music may compete with actual 
sales of sound recordings.138 
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
Because the DPRA left many gaps in legislation supporting the 
enforcement of copyright protection, especially for musical works 
over the Internet, Congress implemented the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (hereinafter DMCA) in 1998.139  The DMCA, a 
compromise between Internet Service Providers (hereinafter ISPs) 
and copyright owners, implements two WIPO treaties and provides  
 
 134 Steven V. Podolsky, Chasing the Future: Has the Digital Performance in Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995 Kept Pace with Technological Advances in Musical Performance, 
or is Copyright Law Lagging Behind?, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 651, 654, 674 
(1999). 
 135 Id. at 674. 
 136 Id. But see supra note 101. 
 137 Supra note 134, at 673-74. 
 138 Id. at 674-75. 
 139 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
FINAL.BALABAN 1/10/02  5:10 PM 
2001] BATTLE OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 259 
 
increased protection for copyrighted material transmitted over the 
Internet.140 
1. The Black Box Provision: Protection Against Technology 
Circumvention 
One of the most important aspects of the DMCA is that it provides 
protection against the circumvention of technological methods 
implemented in order to further digital rights management.141  These 
requirements, also known as a black box provision, provide 
important protection for sound recordings by prohibiting the 
circumvention of technological methods, such as encryption or 
watermarking, which control access to copyrighted works.142  
Primarily, the DMCA includes two anti-circumvention provisions 
under § 1201(a)(1) and § 1201(a)(2).143  These provisions uphold 
encryption and watermarking by requiring that users must not 
interfere in any manner with standard technical measure[s] 
designed to protect or identify copyrighted works.144  Furthermore, 
users cannot make available to others any measures developed to 
defeat such protections against unauthorized access to works.145 
Encryption is like an electronic lock.146  It can prevent persons that 
do not have the correct key, or password, from listening to a sound 
recording.147  The downside to the encryption of sound recordings is 
 
 140 See id. 
 141 See David Balaban, Music in the Digital Millennium: The Effects of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 311, 320-21 (2000). 
 142 Id. at 321. 
 143 Section 1201(a)(1) governs [t]he act of circumventing a technological protection 
measure put in place by a copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work.  17 
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Section 1201(a)(2) supplements the 
prohibition against circumvention with prohibitions on creating and making available 
certain technologies developed or marketed to defeat technological protections against 
unauthorized access to a work.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A), (B), (C). 
 144 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). 
 145 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). 
 146 See Rosemarie F. Jones, Wet Footprints? Digital Watermarks: A Trail to the 
Copyright Infringer on the Internet, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 559 (1999) (describing encryption as 
longstanding means of protection). 
 147 Supra note 141, at 321. 
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that once the correct password has been found it can be passed on 
along with the recording, rendering the encryption useless.  
Watermarks, on the other hand, are inaudible additions to music that 
inform devices that play music of the authenticity of a recording.148  
Watermarks can be used by search engines to determine which sound 
recordings are original and which are illegal copies.149  They can also 
provide a trail by which owners of sound recordings can trace the 
distribution of unauthorized copies throughout the Internet.150  
Furthermore, watermarks cannot be removed from a sound recording 
without a conspicuous degradation in the quality of the recording.151 
It is possible that encryption, watermarking, and other 
technological measures used for digital rights management could 
provide new, secure methods for the downloading of music.152  This 
technology can give the music industry increased control over copies 
of music.  For example, listeners may be permitted to make a copy of 
downloaded music solely for their own use or perhaps to give to a 
friend.153  Technology can also make a recording available only for a 
limited time period.154  It is conceivable that an industry standard 
could be set such that portable players would only play recordings 
that contain legitimate watermarks.155  Many organizations, 
including AT&T, the originators of a2b, and Liquid Audio have 
experimented with secure digital downloading techniques that 
incorporate technology that would make this possible.156 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See supra note 21, at 871 (discussing copyright protection tools). 
 153 See RIAA FAQ, at http://www.riaa.com/Music-SDMI-4.cfm (last visited Nov. 2000).  
See also SDMI FAQ, at http://www.sdmi.org/FAQ.htm (last visited Nov. 2000). 
 154 See RIAA FAQ, at http://www.riaa.com/Music-SDMI-4.cfm (last visited Nov. 2000). 
 155 See id.  The Secure Digital Music Initiative [hereinafter SDMI], a forum of more 
than 160 companies and organizations representing a broad spectrum of information 
technology and consumer electronics businesses, is attempting to implement an industry-
wide watermarking standard for devices that play music.  New music to be distributed will 
contain watermarks.  Compliant devices will be able to play these files, in addition to the 
existing MP3 files. 
 156 See id. 
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However, whether security measures such as encryption and 
watermarking can be successful in application is a matter of debate.  
For example, in September of 2000 the Secure Digital Music 
Initiative (hereinafter SDMI), a collaboration including the big 
five record labels and over 160 companies, created for the task of 
implementing a form of digital protection architecture over music 
files, attempted to create a secure method for protecting copyrighted 
music and was met with mixed results.157  After extensive research, 
the SDMI consortium developed six protection technologies and 
presented them to the hacking community, offering $10,000 as an 
incentive to anyone who could break any of the six technologies.158  
At first glance the results of the contest seemed promising.  The 
official position of SDMI was that two of the 447 submissions to the 
contest were successful attacks upon a protective technology, but that 
only one of the attacks was significant because it could be repeated 
on additional pieces of music.159 
Still, there are a number of reasons to doubt the success of the 
protective technologies.  Computer experts from Princeton 
University, Rice University, and Xerox stand by their claim that they 
hacked through four of the technologies without significantly 
degrading the music.160  They state that they did not submit their 
attacks for consideration in the final round of the contest and that 
therefore their successful attacks upon the protection systems were 
not included as part of the contest results.161  Other experts claim that 
watermarks are, by definition, hackable, and that even if the 
watermarks in question did survive for a four-week long contest it 
 
 157 See http://www.riaa.com/Music-SDMI-4.cfm (last visited Nov. 2000). 
 158 See http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/sdmi/faq.html (last visited Nov. 2000); see also 
The Industry Standards Beat Sheet, A Weekly Report on the Convergence of Music and the 
Net, at http://www.thestandard.com (Oct. 17, 2000). 
 159 See SDMI Continues Evaluation of Proposals for Phase II Technologies, at 
http://www.sdmi.org/pr/VA_Nov_10_2000_PR.htm (last visited Nov. 2001).  See also Sue 
Zeidler, Hackers Win SDMI Prize, Reuters (Nov. 28, 2000), at 
http://techtv.com/print/story/0,23102,3013825,00.html (last visited Dec. 2000). 
 160 See Robert Lemos, Secure Digital Music Hits a Sour Note, ZDNet News (Oct. 23, 
2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2643884,00.html (last visited 
Dec. 2000). 
 161 See Sue Ziedler, Hackers Win SDMI Prize, Reuters (Nov. 28, 2000), at 
http://techtv.com/print/story/0,23102,3013825,00.html (last visited Nov. 2001). 
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would only be a matter of time before the watermarks or any other 
protective technology could be effectively removed.162  A last 
segment of the hacking community has argued that in determining 
the success of the attacks SDMI overemphasized the sound 
degradation of the hacked sound recordings. 163  If this argument has 
any basis then it is possible that the average listener might use the 
circumvention technologies, even those that did not survive the 
contest, to copy encrypted music files without noticing any 
degradation in the sound quality of the music. 
2. Safe Harbors Limit the Liability of Internet Service Providers. 
Although the DMCA attempts to protect copyrighted material 
under the black box provision in consideration of ISPs, it severely 
limits the circumstances under which ISPs can be found liable for 
the infringement of sound recordings and does not require them to 
police their sites.164  The DMCA, which provides for strict liability 
for infringement of copyrights, provides four categories that limit the 
circumstances under which infringement occurs.165  These 
categories, specified as safe harbors, include: 1) Conduit 
Functions, 2) System Caching, 3) User Storage, and 4) Information 
Location Tools.166 
The Conduit Function provision limits an ISPs liability for routing 
sound recordings from one point to another.167  This safe harbor 
resolves the discrepancy in case law between Religious Technology 
Center v. Netcom and Playboy v. Frena.168  The Court in Netcom 
dismissed the possibility of direct or vicarious liability for an ISP 
 
 162 Id. 
 163 Robert Lemos, Secure Digital Music Hits a Sour Note, ZDNet News, Oct. 23, 2000, 
at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/0,4586,2643884,00.html (last visited Dec. 2000). 
 164 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1996 & Supp. V 2001). 
 165 Id. 
 166 See id. 
 167 See Carolyn Andrepont, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, Dec. 1998, at 9. 
 168 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) and Religious 
Tech. Ctr.  v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
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that provided Internet access for a website that illegally distributed 
music over the Internet.169  It held that an ISP is prone only to the 
lesser transgression of contributory infringement.170  This 
contradicted the Court in Frena, which found direct infringement for 
a bulletin board service that, without knowledge of the infringement, 
provided Internet access for a subscriber that illegally posted 
copyrighted photographs from Playboy onto the Internet.171  Under 
the DMCA, a transmission that occurs automatically, without any 
selection of material by the ISP, will not subject an ISP to liability.172  
This codifies the decision in Netcom and makes it harder to hold an 
ISP liable for distributing illegal sound recordings over the 
Internet.173 
System Caching allows an ISP to make a temporary copy of a 
sound recording in order to provide quicker access for its users.174  
Courts have not yet addressed the copyright implications of 
permitting an ISP to temporarily fix a copy of a sound recording on 
its computer system.  ISPs argue that fixation is necessary in order 
to speed up usage.175  However, the court in Mai Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer held that a work fixed in a tangible means of 
expression is one that is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it 
to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period 
of more than transitory duration.176  Using this definition, cached 
sound recordings might have been prohibited under the Copyright 
Act of 1976.177  However, under the DMCA, an ISP must limit 
access to the sound recording to only those people who satisfy the 
 
 169 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372. 
 170 Id. at 1375. 
 171 Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1559. 
 172 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1)(c) (1996). 
 173 See Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Seeking Shelter From the MP3 Storm: How Far Does 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 
7 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 423, 436 (Summer 1999). 
 174 See Tamber Christian, Internet Caching: Something to Think About, 67 UMKC L. 
REV. 477 (Spring 1999). 
 175 Id. at 478. 
 176 Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (1976)). 
 177 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
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conditions imposed by the individual who posted the recording.178  If 
the conditions are broad, then this may allow persons other than the 
intended recipient to access the sound recording. 
User Storage provides the least protection for sound recordings 
and may be the most far-reaching in terms of the ISP functions to 
which it applies.179  It insulates an ISP from liability for storing a 
copy of an infringing sound recording on its system at the direction 
of a third party.180  This reinforces the contributory liability standard 
suggested in Netcom.181  Under this safe harbor, an ISP could store 
an illegal copy of a sound recording on its network and allow the 
average user to access it.  The only requirements for limited liability 
are that the ISP must not have actual knowledge or reason to know 
that the sound recording is infringing and may not receive a direct 
financial benefit from having the infringing material reside on its 
system.182 
The Information Location Tools provision limits an ISPs liability 
for providing hyperlinks, online directories, and search engines that 
link a user to unauthorized copies of sound recordings.183  The extent 
of protection for sound recordings under this section is unclear.  For 
example, website operator and search engine, Lycos, claimed 
immunity from copyright liability under the DMCA.184  Lycos has 
argued that it is immune because it merely provides a link to the 
location  of  sound  files  to its users and does not physically store the  
 
 178 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(D) (1996 & Supp. V 2001). 
 179 See id.  § 512(c) (1996 & Supp. V 2001).  Pursuant to this provision, the popular 
Internet auction site Ebay won a summary judgment that it is not liable for copyright 
infringement under the DMCA to the extent that it does not have the right and ability to 
control infringing activity within the meaning of the DMCA.  See Hendrickson v. Ebay, 
2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14420 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 180 17 U.S.C. § 512 (b)(2)(D) (1996 & Supp. V 2001). 
 181 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 182 17 U.S.C. § 512 (b)(2)(D) (1996 & Supp. V 2001). 
 183 Id. at § 512(d). 
 184 See Markiewicz, supra note 173, at 425. 
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sound recordings on its servers.185  So far the courts have not found 
much merit in Lycos argument.186 
IV. CASE LAW 
A. RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems187 
Late in 1998 the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. 
(hereinafter RIAA), in conjunction with the Alliance of Artists and 
Recording Companies brought suit against Diamond Multimedia 
Systems alleging violation of the AHRA.188  The recording industry 
tried to get a preliminary injunction against Diamond Multimedias 
introduction of the Rio Player into the marketplace, one of the first 
devices with the ability to detach from a computer and still play MP3 
files.189  The Rio player is a compact battery-operated music player 
that comes bundled with software that allows a user to rip music 
from a CD and change it into MP3 format for storage on a 
computers hard drive.190  By connecting the Rio player to a 
computer via a parallel port, the user can then transfer the MP3 files 
from the hard drive to the Rio Player itself.191  Thus, the innovation 
of the Rio player is that it allows MP3 files, which had previously 
been confined only to use in conjunction with a computer, to be 
taken away from the computer.  For the first time, MP3 files could be 
heard with the technology similar in purpose and function to a 
typical walkman. 
 
 185 See Patricia Jacobus, Napster Suit Tests New Copyright Law, at 
http://news.cnet.com/0~1005~200~1679581.html (last visited Nov. 2001). 
 186 See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919 n.24.  But see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Napster II]. 
 187 RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
[hereinafter Diamond I]. 
 188 See id. 
 189 Id. at 625. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
FINAL.BALABAN 1/10/02  5:10 PM 
266 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:235 
 
1. District Court 
The District Court found in favor of Diamond Multimedia based 
on its interpretation of § 1001(11) that the AHRA does not directly 
prohibit serial copying.192  In terms of the Rio player, the District 
Court reasoned that a Rio player used in conjunction with a computer 
does, in fact, satisfy the definition of serial copying under § 1001(11) 
of the AHRA, but violates the Act only in a technical sense.193  In its 
reasoning, the court divided serial copying into two steps: (1) a user 
rips a song from a CD, converts it into an MP3 file, and stores it on 
his hard drive; and (2) the user transfers the MP3 file to the Rio 
player.194  Software had already been independently available to 
accomplish the first step, which was rather commonplace and had 
not invited litigation.195  Therefore, the Court concerned itself 
primarily with the second step, which it considered to be the true 
innovation of the Rio player.196 
Focusing on the Rio player itself and its role in facilitating the 
transfer of MP3 files, the District Court found that Diamond 
Multimedias sole violation of the AHRA was that the Rio player 
was not compliant with § 1002, which requires that digital audio 
recording devices contain SCMS technology.197  Concentrating on 
that aspect, the District Court found that incorporation of SCMS 
technology would accomplish nothing since MP3 files do not 
contain SCMS information.198  Therefore, the Court found that a Rio 
player without SCMS technology was the functional equivalent of a 
Rio player with SCMS technology incorporated into it.199  Thus, 
although the defendants Rio player satisfied the definition of serial 
copying under the AHRA, the Rio player only violated the AHRA in 
a technical sense.200 
 
 192 Diamond I, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 631. 
 193 Id. at 632. 
 194 Id. at 631. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Diamond I, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 632. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
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Moreover, the District Court found that the AHRA does not 
directly prohibit serial copying, and the only wrongful conduct of the 
defendant was its failure to encode SCMS technology into the Rio 
player, a technical shortcoming.201  The Court also found that the 
failure to encode the SCMS technology was not likely to encourage 
illegitimate uses of MP3 files since such uses were possible 
regardless of the Rio player and regardless of the SCMS 
technology.202  Therefore, the wrongful act of the defendant was not 
linked to the irreparable harm claimed by the plaintiff.203 
2. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Perhaps unfortunate for recording artists, the opinion of the 
District Court was later expanded upon by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which went so far as to interpret the AHRA as specifically 
exempting computer hard drives from coverage under its 
provisions.204  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
computer hard drives simply do not fall within the definition of 
digital music recordings as defined in § 1001 of the AHRA.205  
Under § 1001(5)(B) the AHRA specifically exempts from its 
provisions devices that are material object[s] in which one or more 
computer programs are fixed.206  The Ninth Circuit held that 
computer hard drives fall within the category of material objects and 
are exempted from the AHRA.207 
The Court also noted that under § 1001(3), the primary purpose 
provision of the AHRA, the primary purpose of computers does not 
 
 201 Id. 
 202 Diamond I, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 633. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1078. 
 205 Id. at 1078 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(A)) (defining a digital musical recording as 
a material object (i) in which are fixed, in a digital recording format, only sounds, and 
material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed sounds, if any, and (ii) from 
which the sounds and material can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.) (emphasis supplied). 
 206 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B) exempts material objects in which one or more computer 
programs are fixed from coverage by the AHRA. 
 207 Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1076. 
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include the making or copying of digital audio recordings.208  Prior to 
the Ninth Circuits decision, the AHRA already exempted 
professional devices such as dictation machines, answering 
machines, and other recording devices whose primary purpose is 
the fixation of non-musical sounds.209  However, in its decision the 
Ninth Circuit extended this exemption to include computer hard 
drives, stating that the primary purpose of a computer is not to make 
digital recordings of music and therefore the AHRA does not govern 
the copying of music files to and from computer hard drives.210  The 
primary purpose of a computer, according to the Ninth Circuit, is to 
run various programs and to record the data necessary to run those 
programs and perform various tasks, not to record music.211 
Citing 17 U.S.C. § 1008, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the result 
of its decision is consistent with the purpose of the AHRA, to allow 
consumers to make copies of audio recordings for their private, 
noncommercial use.212  Citing Sony, where time-shifting by users of 
home video recorders was held to be fair use, the Ninth Circuit also 
suggested that the Rio player merely performs the equally innocuous 
function of space-shifting music from a computers hard drive to a 
portable player.213 
B. UMG Recordings v. MP3.com214 
Some of the evidence in this case strongly suggests that some 
companies operating in the area of the Internet may have a 
 
 208 Id.  at 1078 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3)). 
 209 See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3).  A digital audio recording device is any machine or 
device of a type commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not 
included with or as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of 
which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a 
digital audio copied recording for private use, except for . . . 
 210 See Diamond II, 180 F.3d. at 1078-79. 
 211 Id. at 1078. 
 212 Id. at 1079. 
 213 Id.  See also infra Part IV(A) and Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984) (upholding the time-shifting of copyrighted material enabled by the 
introduction of the VCR as a new technology.  Time-shifting allows VCR owners to tape 
programs for later viewing.) 
 214 UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 2000 WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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misconception that, because their technology is somewhat novel, 
they are somehow immune from the ordinary applications of laws of 
the United States, including copyright law.  They need to understand 
that the laws domain knows no such limits.215 
In September of 2000, several record labels brought suit against 
MP3.com for its services introduced on its MY.MP3.com website on 
or about January 10, 2000.216  On its website, the defendant primarily 
offered two services.217  The defendants Beam-It service allowed 
users to access CDs from any computer at any location once the user 
stepped through a series of low hurdles, which involved the user 
exhibiting that he was in possession of the CD to be accessed.218  
Moreover, the defendants Instant Listening service allowed users 
to immediately listen to a sound recording in MP3 format once 
having agreed to purchase a recording of the music.219 
MP3.com made this feat possible by copying the contents of tens 
of thousands of CDs, converting them to MP3 format, and placing 
them on its computer systems.220  The service was designed to 
compete with other websites, such as MyPlay.com, which allowed 
users to upload their own MP3 files onto the MyPlay website, and 
the user could access his uploaded songs at a later date from any 
location.221  However, unlike MyPlay.com, MP3.com actually 
provided copies of the songs for its users to access.  Users were 
required only to prove possession of a CD, which is not equivalent to 
ownership of the CD.  Thus, it is estimated that a large number of 
users were able to borrow, or otherwise obtain, copies of CDs in 
order to satisfy MyPlay.coms ownership requirement.222  These 
users, without ever having purchased a CD, were able to access the 
content of CDs provided on MyPlay.com.223  At trial, evidence 
suggested that even the managers and engineers at MP3.com realized 
 
 215 Id. at *6. 
 216 Id. at *3. 
 217 Id. at *2. 
 218 Id. 
 219 MP3.com, 2000 WL 1262568, at *2. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at *3. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at *2. 
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that the copying of music by My.MP3.com would very likely lead to 
the copyright infringement of music. 224 
Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New York was 
unequivocal in his decision against MP3.com.  The Judge found that 
even under the high standard of clear and convincing evidence, 
MP3.com infringed plaintiffs copyrights by contributing to the 
unauthorized copying of the contents of tens of thousands of 
copyrighted CDs containing hundreds of thousands of copyrighted 
songs.225  Furthermore, the Judge dismissed the defendants fair use 
arguments as little more than a sham since the users did not store 
their own personal collection of CDs on MP3.coms website, but 
rather accessed the MP3 collection supplied for commercial purposes 
by MP3.com.226  The Court held that fair use does not include music 
copied onto servers solely for the purpose of commercial use.227 
The Judge also held that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of 
proof that the defendant had either actual knowledge of copyright 
infringement or acted in reckless disregard of the high probability of 
infringement.228  Since the plaintiffs offered clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant knew it was engaging in unlawful 
activity, the Judge found that the defendant was willful in its 
infringement of the plaintiffs copyrights.229  Moreover, because the 
potential for harm from the infringement was deemed to be large, the 
Judge awarded statutory damages amounting to $25,000 per CD and 
left the determination of the number of CDs that would qualify for 
damages for a later date.230 
 
 224 See MP3.com, 2000 WL 1262568, at *2. 
 225 See id. at *1. 
 226 Id. at *3. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at *4. 
 229 See MP3.com, 2000 WL 1262568, at *2. 
 230 Id. at *6. 
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C. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes231 
Around the same time period in 2000, Judge Kaplan entered a 
judgment upholding technical copyright protection measures used to 
protect copyrighted content, such as full- length motion pictures, 
found on digital versatile disks (DVDs).232  In Reimerdes, eight 
major motion picture studios brought suit against Eric Corley, a 
leader among the computer hacker community and publisher of 2600 
magazine, and two of his cohorts for distributing via a website a 
computer program designed to circumvent technological measures 
protecting copyrighted material on DVDs.233 
Most motion pictures that are distributed on DVD employ Content 
Scramble System (hereinafter CSS) technology as a protection 
against unauthorized access.234  CSS technology is an 
encryption-based security and authentication system that requires the 
use of appropriately configured hardware, such as a DVD player or a 
computer DVD drive, to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not 
copy DVDs.235  Thus, access to DVDs employing CSS technology 
is limited to devices licensed with the appropriate decryption 
technology, which notably does not permit copying of DVDs.236  
Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Reimerdes were concerned that 
distribution of a computer program that hacked through the 
encryption technology would facilitate copyright infringement on a 
large scale.237  This concern was compounded by the fact that DVD 
revenues may represent up to 35% or 40% of revenue for the motion 
picture studios (such as Warner Brothers).238  Therefore, the 
circumvention of CSS technology would impede the development of 
 
 231 Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 232 See id. (holding that posting computer software that decrypted encrypted movies for 
download to DVDs was a copyright violation). 
 233 See id. 
 234 See id. at 303, 309-10. 
 235 See id. at 309-10. 
 236 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309-10. 
 237 See id. 
 238 See id. at 310-11 (citing nn.69-70) (estimating the percentage of motion picture studio 
revenue as represented by DVD sales based on trial transcript (King) at 403). 
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technology to create new, otherwise lucrative initiatives for the 
distribution of motion pictures in digital form.239 
Nonetheless, the defendants were distributing via a website a 
Windows-executable file (called DeCSS) created by another hacker, 
fifteen-year-old Jon Johansen, which decrypts DVDs on Windows 
compatible computers.240  After decryption, computer files 
containing the motion picture can easily be copied, repeatedly if 
desired, for use on computers using either the Windows operating 
system or the Linux operating system.241  Furthermore, once a 
motion picture has been decrypted, it can be compressed using a 
DivX compression algorithm that enables a full-length motion 
picture to be compressed into a 650 MB file.242  The significance of 
compression is that the file becomes much more manageable and can 
be burned onto a single writeable CD using a conventional CD 
burner.243 
1. Distribution of Anti-circumvention Technology Violates the 
DMCA. 
The Reimerdes Court found that the defendants clearly violated § 
1201(a)(2), which prohibits making available technologies developed 
to defeat technological protections against unauthorized access to a 
work, by distributing anti-circumvention measures via a web-site.244  
The defendants violated § 1201(a)(2) by providing DeCSS on their 
web site and also by providing links to other web sites created 
primarily to offer DeCSS for download.245  The Court held that, by 
providing links to other sites that automatically begin the process of 
downloading DeCSS, the defendants were in effect engaged in the 
functional equivalent of transferring the DeCSS code to the user 
 
 239 Id. at 315. 
 240 See id. at 311. 
 241 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 242 See id. at 313. 
 243 See id. at 314. 
 244 Id. at 316. 
 245 Id. at 303-04. 
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themselves.246  Moreover, because CSS is a technology developed to 
effectively control access to copyrighted works, as defined by the 
DMCA, and DeCSS was designed primarily for the purpose of 
circumventing that technology, its distribution violated the 
DMCA.247 
During trial, the defendants argued unsuccessfully that DeCSS was 
created primarily so that DVDs could be viewed on the Linux 
operating system for which no CSS compatible players were 
available at the time.248  Therefore, the dissemination of DeCSS 
should be exempted under § 1201(f) of the DMCA, which allows 
exemptions for reverse engineering and for circumvention to achieve 
interoperability with another computer program.249  However, the 
Court found that under the DMCA, information enabling 
interoperability with other programs could only be distributed to the 
extent that it would not constitute infringement.250  Furthermore, the 
Court held that the right to achieve interoperability, as defined in the 
DMCA, does not apply to public dissemination of means of 
circumvention.251  According to the Court, since the only function 
of the DeCSS program is to circumvent CSS protection measures on 
a Windows operating system, its purpose extended well beyond 
achieving interoperability with the Linux operating system.252  
Moreover, the Court found that the motivation of the defendants to 
make DVDs interoperable with the Linux operating system was 
immaterial to the fact that they widely distributed software that 
circumvented copyright protection measures.253 
Similarly, the Court dismissed the defendants arguments that their 
actions were exempted under other provisions of the DMCA.  The 
Court rejected the contention that the defendants actions could be 
classified as good faith encryption research under the DMCA 
because it found that the defendants research did not advance the 
 
 246 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 325. 
 247 Id. at 317-18. 
 248 See id. at 319. 
 249 See id. at 320. 
 250 See DMCA § 1201(f). 
 251 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320. 
 252 See id. at 319. 
 253 Id. 
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state of knowledge of encryption technology.254  This was evidenced 
by the fact that the results of the research were not communicated to 
the copyright owner in a timely manner.255  The Court also dismissed 
the defendants weak assertion that they were assessing a security 
testing system, a use that might be permitted under the DMCA.256 
2. Distribution of Anti-circumvention Technology is Not a Fair 
Use. 
The defendants in Reimerdes claimed that the distribution of 
DeCSS technology constituted fair use inasmuch as it allowed fair 
and lawful uses of the protected materials.257  However, the Court 
felt that although access control measures, such as CSS, involve 
some risk of preventing fair and lawful uses of copyrighted material, 
Congress realized this potential for limiting fair uses and struck a 
balance through the DMCA.258  For example, Congress expressly 
created a series of exceptions considered as fair uses, such as reverse 
engineering, security testing, good faith encryption research, and 
certain uses by nonprofit libraries and educational institutions.259  In 
addition, Congress enacted a study on the effects of § 1201(a)(1) and 
expressly prohibited its application to subsequent actions of a person 
once he or she obtained authorized access to a copy of a 
[copyrighted] work. . . .260  Therefore, the Court felt that the 
traditional defenses to copyright infringement, such as fair use, only 
apply after it has been established that access to the material is 
authorized under the DMCA.261 
Notably, the Court rejected the application of fair use under the 
Sony case, stating that the case involved a construction of the 
Copyright Act that has been overruled by the later enactment of the 
 
 254 Id. at 304. 
 255 See id. at 321; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(2). 
 256 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j). 
 257 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22. 
 258 Id. at 322. 
 259 Id. at 323. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
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DMCA. . . .262  Regardless, the Court felt that it was facing a 
different question than that faced in Sony.263  In Sony the Court faced 
the question of whether manufacturers could be held liable for 
infringement by purchasers of equipment for which there were a 
multitude of non-infringing uses.264  In Reimerdes the Court 
considered the question of whether it should uphold the 
dissemination of anti-circumvention technology that held only the 
possibility (not a multitude) of non-infringing uses.265  Thus, the 
Court felt that the mere possibility of non-infringing uses of a 
technology developed to circumvent access measures protected by 
the DMCA did not exempt the technology from liability.266 
3. The DMCA Does Not Unduly Restrict First Amendment Rights. 
The Court in Reimerdes also held that the anti-trafficking 
provision of the DMCA as applied to the posting of computer code 
that circumvents measures that control access to copyrighted works 
in digital form is a valid exercise of Congress authority.267  The 
Court made it clear that the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA 
serves an important governmental interest by protecting copyrighted 
works from digital piracy, thereby promoting the availability of 
[copyrighted] content in digital form.268  It found that any impact on 
the dissemination of a programmers ideas, through limitations in the 
distribution of their programs, was purely incidental to the overriding 
concerns of promoting the digital distribution of copyrighted works 
and protecting them from piracy.269 
In its ruling, the Court determined that the application of content-
neutral limitations on the non-speech, functional aspects of a 
 
 262 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323; see also Sony Corp.  v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 (1984). 
 263 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
 264 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 420; see also Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
 265 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
 266 Id. at 323-24. 
 267 Id. at 332.  [T]he Supreme Court has made clear that copyright protection itself is 
the engine of free expression.  Id. at 330. 
 268 Id. at 330. 
 269 Id. at 329. 
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computer program prevents the circumvention of technology without 
unduly restricting expressive activities.270  The Court concluded that, 
whereas computer code is expressive, it also has a distinctly 
functional, non-speech aspect.271  Moreover, it found that the 
functional aspects of the programmers computer code do more than 
simply express the concepts of the computer programmer.272  
Therefore, by placing content-neutral limitations on the functional 
aspects of the computer program, the DMCA can prevent the 
circumvention of technology without unduly restricting the 
expressive aspects of the computer code.273 
However, the Court emphasized that its holding concerning the 
First Amendment is narrow in its applicability.  The Court stated that 
its holding 
is limited (1) to programs that circumvent access controls 
to copyrighted works in digital form in circumstances in 
which (2) there is no other practical means of preventing 
infringement through use of the programs, and (3) the 
regulation is motivated by a desire to prevent performance 
of the function for which the programs exist rather than 
any message they might convey.274 
D. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.275 
In December of 1999, a group of eighteen record labels and music 
publishers sought a preliminary injunction against Napster claiming 
that Napsters file-sharing services constitute both contributory and 
vicarious infringement of copyrights on a mass scale.276  The 
plaintiffs introduced evidence that as much as 87% of the music files 
examined by their experts represent copyrighted material for which 
 
 270 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 329. 
 271 Id. at 328-29. 
 272 Id. 
 273 See id. at 329. 
 274 Id. at 333. 
 275 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896. 
 276 Id. at 900. 
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the copyright owners are not compensated when distributed through 
Napsters file-sharing system.277  Furthermore, internal documents 
stated that, by the end of 2000, Napster would have serviced 
approximately seventy-five million users.278  Conversely, Napster 
asserted that it does not infringe any copyrighted material because 
Napster itself does not download or store any music on its own 
computers, but merely provides the mechanism through which its 
users can locate and download music.279  Thus, Napster claimed 
immunity from liability as an information location tool qualified for 
limited liability under 512(d) of the DMCA.280  Furthermore, Napster 
asserted that any incidental copyright infringement is fair use under § 
107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.281 
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction against Napster, 
finding that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of direct 
copyright infringement; that downloading and uploading of MP3 
files by Napster users was not fair use; that plaintiffs had established 
a likelihood of success; and that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive 
relief.282  However, the Ninth Circuit temporarily stayed the 
preliminary injunction, pending modifications by the District 
Court.283 
1. The Ninth Circuit: An Epilogue for Napster? 
On review of the District Courts decision, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the preliminary injunction granted by the District Court 
subject only to certain modifications.284  For instance, the Ninth 
 
 277 Id. at 903. 
 278 Id. at 902. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919. 
 281 In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001). 
 282 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926. 
 283 Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1029. 
 284 Id. at 1027-28.  The Ninth Circuit outright rejected Napsters arguments that the 
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Circuit found that the preliminary injunction was overbroad because 
it placed too much of a burden on Napster to ensure that no 
copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing of 
plaintiffs works occur on the system.285  Instead, the Ninth Circuit 
placed the burden on the plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of the 
copyrighted works available on the Napster system before conferring 
upon Napster the duty to police its service for infringing works.286 
Specifically, the Court modified the preliminary injunction such 
that contributory liability can only be imposed upon Napster to the 
extent that it (1) receives reasonable knowledge of specific 
infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions and sound 
recordings; (2) knows or should know that such files are available on 
the Napster system; and (3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of 
the works.287  In addition, Napster may be vicariously liable when 
it fails to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system [and] to 
preclude access to potentially infringing files listed in its search 
index.288 
a. Napster Facilitates Infringing Uses of Copyrighted Music. 
In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that 
Napster does indeed violate two of the copyright holders exclusive 
rights: the right of reproduction under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) and the 
right of distribution under § 106(3).289  It also rejected Napsters 
affirmative defense that it does not directly infringe plaintiffs 
copyrights because its users are engaged in the fair use of 
copyrighted material.290  Napster argued that such potential fair uses 
of its service include space-shifting music files, sampling of 
incomplete portions of music files, and the authorized distribution of 
 
injunction was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as well as Napsters affirmative 
defenses of waiver, implied license, and copyright misuse. 
 285 Id. at 1027. 
 286 See id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1027. 
 289 Id. at 1014. 
 290 Id. at 1016-17. 
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new and unsigned artists works.291  However, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the District Courts determination that if the case were to go 
to trial, space-shifting, time-shifting, and sampling of incomplete 
portions of music files would not be likely to qualify for the 
affirmative defense of fair use.292  It also rejected Napsters argument 
that it should be permitted to function for the part it plays in the 
permissive reproduction of independent or established artists works 
because the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin this activity.293 
Napster tried to liken its services to the space shifting upheld in 
Diamond Multimedia and time-shifting as upheld in Sony.294  
However, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Napsters file-sharing 
services from both space-shifting and time-shifting, emphasizing that 
unlike the use of Napsters services, the uses upheld in Diamond 
Multimedia and in Sony do not include the displacement of sales 
through public dissemination of copyrighted materials to millions of 
persons free of charge.295  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit determined 
that Diamond Multimedia and Sony upheld as fair use the copying of 
copyrighted works for personal use, but not copying for commercial 
use or for mass distribution to the general public.296 
To a large extent, the Ninth Circuits ruling followed from the 
proceeding in the District Court, where Judge Patel observed that 
space-shifting of music is not a substantial use of Napsters 
service.297  According to the District Court, whereas the primary 
 
 291 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001). 
 292 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015, 1019.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the factors 
considered in determining fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature 
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for [the work] or 
[the] value of the copyrighted work.) 
 293 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 294 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16.  See Diamond II, 180 F.3d 1072 (upholding the 
space-shifting of music off of computer hard drives for portable use in the Rio player); see 
also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (upholding the time-
shifting of copyrighted material enabled by the introduction of the VCR as a new 
technology).  Time-shifting is the copying of copyrighted material, such as television 
programming, for private non-commercial use at a later time. 
 295 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019; see also Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16. 
 296 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 297 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916. 
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purpose of the Rio player in Diamond Multimedia was to space-shift 
music files for portable use, Napster users access its service for the 
purpose of downloading unauthorized copies of copyrighted music 
and avoiding purchase costs.298  In addition, the District Court noted 
that most Napster users do not access Napster for the purpose of 
space-shifting music for portable listening at different locations.299  
Similarly, the District Court distinguished Napster use from the fair 
use of time-shifting upheld in Sony, observing that VCRs facilitate 
the taping of material that the viewer has been invited to see entirely 
free of charge.  In the view of the District Court, Napster facilitates 
the copying of music files for which the plaintiffs almost always 
charge for access.300 
Napster also asserted the affirmative defense of fair use, claiming 
that its services are akin to visiting and sampling music at a free 
listening station at a record store and to other forms of online 
sampling.301  However, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Courts 
rejection of this defense on the grounds that sampling music through 
Napster is a commercial use that adversely affects the market for 
plaintiffs copyrighted music.302  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
District Courts distinction that unlike record stores, Napster 
transfers copies of music to its listeners without first requiring them 
to purchase the music.303  Likewise, the Ninth Circuit found that 
unlike other forms of sampling over the Internet, which typically 
allow for only thirty-to-sixty-second samples of music, Napster 
provides access to entire songs.304  In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
found that even in the unlikely event that Napster use does not 
adversely affect the market for the plaintiffs  copyrighted works, the  
 
 298 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 299 See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 904-05.  Space-shifting of a users own private 
music collection through Napsters service would require a user to log on to Napster from 
one computer, leave the location of that computer (while maintaining the computers 
connection to Napster), travel to another computer at another location, and then download 
music files onto the second computer from the first. 
 300 Id. at 913. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018. 
 303 See id. 
 304 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14. 
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unauthorized spread of music by Napster should not deprive the 
copyright holders of the right to license the material.305 
Overall, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Courts 
characterization of Napsters service as a commercial mechanism 
that infringes copyrighted material without transforming or adding 
value to the copyrighted work in any way.306  The Ninth Circuit 
noted that the mere retransmission of an original copyrighted work 
through a new medium is unlikely to constitute fair use.307  It also 
noted that commercial use does not require a showing of direct 
economic benefit, but may be demonstrated by the repeated and 
exploitative unauthorized copying of copyrighted works made in 
order to save an expense, such as the expense of purchasing 
authorized copies of musical works.308 
b. Napster Is Subject to Contributory Liability. 
In order to determine the likelihood of Napster being held liable as 
a contributory infringer at trial, the Ninth Circuit considered whether 
Napster had the requisite knowledge of the infringing activity and 
whether it induced, caused, or materially contributed to the 
infringing conduct of another.309  After considering the record, the 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that Napster both knew 
of and materially contributed to the infringement of copyrighted 
music, but disagreed with the District Courts reasoning as to the 
knowledge requirement.310  Rejecting the District Courts view that 
general knowledge of infringing conduct satisfies the knowledge 
 
 305 Id. 
 306 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015. 
 307 Id. (citing Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998)) 
(finding the retransmission of a radio broadcast over a telephone line does not transform the 
original work and is not a fair use). 
 308 Id. 
 309 See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918 (quoting Gershwin Publg Corp. v. Columbia 
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that a contributory infringer 
is one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another). 
 310 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-22.  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court 
that Napster materially contributes to the infringement of copyrighted material because 
without its services Napster users could not easily find and download music. 
FINAL.BALABAN 1/10/02  5:10 PM 
282 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:235 
 
requirement, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant cannot be held to 
contributory liability unless it has specific knowledge of infringing 
conduct.311 
In its defense, Napster argued that because its software is 
incapable of determining specific infringing uses, Napster could not 
know of any particular instances of infringement and does not satisfy 
the knowledge requirement of contributory liability.312  Napster 
argued that this was true even though its employees may have 
generally been aware of Napsters potential for infringing uses.313  
Therefore, Napster argued that it cannot reasonably verify infringing 
uses on its online directory and should not have to police its service 
for infringing material.314  The District Court rejected Napsters 
arguments stating that general knowledge that third parties 
performed copyrighted works satisfies the knowledge element of 
contributory infringement and that actual knowledge of specific acts 
of infringement is not required.315  However, the Ninth Circuit did 
not agree with the District Courts determination and instead ruled 
that the standard for determining knowledge for the purpose of 
contributory liability hinges upon the defendants specific 
knowledge, not only its general knowledge, of infringing uses.316  
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit placed the burden upon the plaintiffs 
to provide the necessary documentation to the defendant showing 
that there is likely infringement.317 
In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit followed a logic similar to that 
in Sony, noting that although file-sharing is currently used primarily 
for the infringement of copyrighted works, in the future file-sharing 
 
 311 Id. at 1021. 
 312 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918. 
 313 Id.  Napsters software cannot read watermarks or any other information that might 
provide notice of copyrighted material. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id.  See also Gershwin Publg Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1163 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 316 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, at 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (denying 
Netcoms motion for summary judgment of noninfringement and plaintiffs motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, finding that a disputed issue of fact existed as to whether the 
operator had sufficient knowledge of infringing activity). 
 317 Id. 
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may be capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses.318  
Since Napster may be capable of substantial non-infringing uses in 
the future, the Ninth Circuit refused to impute the requisite 
knowledge of infringing uses from the mere possibility or even the 
general knowledge that at present Napsters services have been and 
may be used to infringe plaintiffs copyrights.319  Thus, according to 
the Ninth Circuit, the District Court overemphasized the current 
infringing uses of Napster and devalued its possible non-infringing 
uses in the future.320 
Having determined that a finding of contributory liability requires 
the specific knowledge of infringing uses, the Ninth Circuit moved 
on to the question of whether Napster had specific knowledge of 
infringing uses of its services.  The Ninth Circuit found that Napster 
did have the requisite specific knowledge of infringing uses because 
the RIAA had provided Napster with a listing of more than 12,000 
infringing files located on Napsters system.321  Therefore, the Court 
upheld the determination that pending a trial, the plaintiffs would 
likely prevail in establishing that Napster had knowledge of 
infringing uses.322   
c. Napster Is Subject to Vicarious Liability. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the plaintiffs 
would be likely to succeed at trial in holding Napster to vicarious 
liability.323  It upheld the District Courts determination that Napster 
has a financial interest in the infringing uses of its service and, at the 
same time, has failed to exercise both its right and its ability to 
 
 318 Id.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-48 (1984) (refusing to hold the manufacturer and 
retailers of video tape recorders liable for contributory infringement despite evidence that 
such machines could be and were used to infringe plaintiffs copyrighted television shows). 
 319 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021.  See also Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.  Following Sony, the 
Ninth Circuit declined to impute the requisite level of knowledge where the defendants 
made and sold equipment capable of both infringing and significant noninfringing uses. 
 320 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021. 
 321 Id. at 1022. 
 322 Id. at 1021. 
 323 See id. 
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supervise the infringing activity.324  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit 
found evidence of Napsters financial interest in the infringing 
activities from several reports submitted by the plaintiffs in the 
District Court, including the Teece Report, the Jay Report, and the 
Fine Report. 325  On the whole, the reports tie Napsters future 
revenue directly to its increase in its user base, which, in turn, grows 
with increases in the quantity and quality of music available through 
Napsters service.326  Notwithstanding the reports, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the District Courts review of Napsters own internal 
documents, which further revealed Napsters strategy of attaining a 
critical mass with plans to monetize its user base in the future.327  
Notably, some potential revenue sources for Napster include targeted 
email, advertising, commissions from links to commercial websites, 
the direct marketing of CDs, Napster products, and CD burners and 
rippers.328  In addition, the very existence of such a large and easily 
monetized user base makes Napster a potentially attractive 
acquisition for larger, more established firms. 
Having determined Napsters financial interest in the infringing 
uses of its services, the Ninth Circuit found that Napster did, in fact, 
have the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity on its 
site.329  In actuality, Napster expressly reserved the right to supervise 
infringing activity through a disclaimer on its website.330  Moreover, 
 
 324 Id. at 1023. 
 325 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1016-17 (stating that [p]laintiffs expert, Dr. David J. 
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expert, Dr. E. Deborah Jay, conducted a survey (the Jay Report) using a random sample of 
college and university students to track their reasons for using Napster and the impact 
Napster had on their music purchases.  The report found evidence of lost sales attributable 
to college use.  Furthermore, plaintiffs also offered a study conducted by Michael Fine, 
Chief Executive Officer of Soundscan, (the Fine Report) to determine the effect of online 
sharing of MP3 files in order to show irreparable harm.  Fine found that online file-sharing 
had resulted in a loss of album sales within college markets.). 
 326 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902. 
 327 Id. 
 328 Id. 
 329 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022. 
 330 See id. at 1023.  On its website, Napster expressly reserved the right to refuse 
service and terminate accounts in [its] discretion, including, but not limited to, if Napster 
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since a right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent to 
avoid vicarious liability, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Courts 
finding that Napster failed to prevent the exchange of copyrighted 
material.331  The Ninth Circuit also indicated that Napster may not 
have been able to avoid liability without a disclaimer simply by 
turning a blind eye to the infringement.332 
However, in its decision, the Ninth Circuit lessened the burden 
upon Napster to police its service based upon the limits of the 
architecture of its software.333  Notably, Napsters software is set up 
such that the information about the musical works distributed 
through its system is limited to the names of the music files, as input 
by its users, on the search indices.334  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that Napster must police only its search indices for 
infringing recordings.335 
d. Napster May Qualify For Limited Liability Under the 
DMCA, But the AHRA Does Not Apply. 
Interestingly, in the face of Diamond Multimedia, Napster tried to 
argue that MP3 files are covered by the AHRA.336  Napster argued 
that the exchange of MP3 files through its service is the type of 
noncommercial use protected from infringement actions under the 
AHRA.337  Napster asserted that it cannot be held secondarily liable 
for its users non-actionable exchange of copyrighted musical 
recordings through its service.338  Conversely, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the District Court that the AHRA does not apply to MP3 
files transmitted between computer hard drives.339  Following from 
 
believes that user conduct violates applicable law . . . or for any reason in Napsters sole 
discretion, with or without cause. 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. at 1023-24. 
 334 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024. 
 335 Id. 
 336 See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1078. 
 337 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023-24; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1996 & Supp. 2001). 
 338 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024. 
 339 Id. 
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Diamond Multimedia, the Ninth Circuit held that MP3 files 
transmitted through Napsters file-sharing service are not digital 
audio recordings, as defined by the AHRA, because their primary 
purpose is not to make digital audio copies of recordings.340 
However, the Ninth Circuit did not accept the District Courts 
overbroad assertions that § 512 of the DMCA will not ever limit the 
liability of contributory infringers.341  Section 512(d) limits the 
liability of ISPs acting in the narrow capacity of providing 
hyperlinks, online directories, and search engines that link a user to 
unauthorized copies of sound recordings.342  Notably, the District 
Court rejected Napsters argument that it should qualify for limited 
liability under § 512(d) of the DMCA.343  Although the District 
Court found that the DMCA does provide for limited liability for 
contributory infringers under § 512(d)(1)(A), it does so only to the 
extent that a service provider does not have actual knowledge of 
infringement.344  Since the District Court determined that Napster 
had actual knowledge of infringement, it refused to limit Napsters 
liability under § 512(d) of the DMCA.345 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this position and recognized that 
although the balance of hardships may tip in favor of the plaintiffs, 
the question of limited liability under the DMCA would have to be 
more fully developed at trial.346  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
found that Napster raised several significant questions under the 
DMCA, including: (1) whether Napster is an Internet service 
provider as defined by 17 U.S.C. §  512(d); (2) whether copyright 
owners must give a service provider official notice of infringing 
activity in order for it to have knowledge or awareness of infringing 
activity on its system; and (3) whether Napster complies with § 
 
 340 Id.  See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1078. 
 341 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1025. 
 342 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (1996 & Supp. 2001). 
 343 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919 n.24. 
 344 See id.  See also DMCA § 512(d)(C).  The court did not address the question of 
whether Napster, a website, could even qualify as a service provider for purposes of the 
DMCA.  Service providers typically provide users access to the Internet.  Websites, on the 
other hand, provide locations for users to visit once on the Internet. 
 345 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919. 
 346 Napster II, 239 F. 3d at 1025. 
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512(i), which requires a service provider to timely establish a 
detailed copyright compliance policy.347 
CONCLUSION: POLICY CONCERNING FILE-SHARINGSTRIKING A 
BALANCE BETWEEN THE INCENTIVE TO CREATE AND THE PROMOTION 
OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
The advantages of file-sharing must be balanced with the need to 
provide artists with the incentive to create new works.  Traditionally, 
musical artists have been held in high regard.  In fact, history has 
developed a long list of musicians, from Mozart and Beethoven to 
the more recent Copland and even Madonna, all of whom have been 
rewarded for their efforts.348  Such rewards have provided the 
incentive for musicians to create the works that have become staples 
in our society.  Napster, however, has built its service entirely at the 
expense of musicians.  In the present day, Napster takes monetary 
rewards away from artists for its own benefit.  Napster has, with very 
little effort, usurped the works of a multitude of musicians and 
packaged them into one website for its own benefit.  It robs artists of 
hard-earned royalties that they deserve for the effort they put into 
creating their music. 
Realizing the inherent problems introduced by the change in the 
distribution of music from physical album sales toward digital 
transmission of music over the Internet, Congress has recently 
implemented both the DPRA and the DMCA.  Although imperfect, 
these statutes go a long way toward the goal of compensating 
 
 347 Id. 
 348 See THE LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC (Geoffrey Hindley ed., 1996).  It is 
interesting to note that Mozart, who enjoyed international fame beginning early in his 
career, died in poverty.  Id. at 242.  After provoking his own dismissal from his post in the 
court of Salzburg, Mozart attempted late in life to earn his living as a freelance composer 
and performer.  Id.  However, a general lack of copyright protection in Europe during the 
late 18th century made it difficult for Mozart to make a living solely as a freelance artist, 
contributing to his pauper status.  Id.  Thus, toward the end of his life Mozart, despite 
constant acclaim, was unable to profit from his immense talent.  Id. 
  Beethoven, on the other hand, born more than fifty years after Mozart, appears to 
have been the first composer to attempt to live exclusively as a freelance artist from the 
beginning of his career.  Id. at 264.  Although Beethoven often found himself in financial 
difficulties, he was by no measure a poor man upon his death.  Id. 
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musicians for the distribution of their works over the Internet.  If a 
balance is to be struck whereby copyright owners are compensated 
for the digital distribution of their works, then the courts must follow 
the lead of Congress and protect copyright owners interests.  Should 
the courts uphold the interests of copyright owners along the lines of 
Reimerdes and Napster, then perhaps the music, publishing, film, 
and video industries can work toward discovering a reliable 
mechanism for the mass licensing of copyrighted works over the 
Internet. 
 
